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1. Introduction 
The aviation industry has come under increasing scrutiny over the last few years from 
both environmentalists and policy-makers. The main issue is the responsibility the 
industry has in relation to global greenhouse gas emissions. Although the aviation 
industry and its emissions have been growing at a high rate, its contribution to 
greenhouse gas emissions remains small, approximately 3% of global emissions. Yet, 
because of the traditional view associating flying with holidays and hence a luxury 
product, this growth is seen as not only environmentally unsustainable but also 
irresponsible.  
 
As a consequence, a number of different measures have been proposed and/or 
implemented around the world in a bid to curb air travel. The stated objective of these 
policies is to control emissions of greenhouse gases from aviation. However, they 
inevitably also have an impact on the number of people flying. In this paper we look at 
air travel for tourism purposes only. Business travel, which would not respond to 
financial incentives in the same manner as personal travel, is excluded.  
 
The measures discussed in this paper are ones that have been implemented in different 
EU countries (the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) or that are set to be put into 
practice in the future (EU). The Netherlands and the UK tax passengers depending on 
their destination. Different levels of tax will clearly result in varying levels of change. We 
show that the way destinations are grouped into tax bands has different consequences on 
substitution between destinations. There have also been suggestions made to tax the 
planes as a whole and not the individual passengers. This would account for the problems 
associated with planes flying at less than full capacity, which emit almost the same 
emissions as full planes.  
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Other proposals involve including aviation in permit markets and the introduction of a 
carbon tax. Probably the most innovative proposal is the “Green Miles” scheme 
suggested by the British Conservative Party. This suggestion involved the introduction of 
a “Green Air Miles Allowance” whereby people would get an allowance of one short-
haul trip a year (first 2,000 miles flown) and would then pay a higher rate of tax on the 
rest of their flights.1 Surprisingly the most direct way of taxing emissions, a kerosene tax, 
has only been implemented on a domestic level in a few countries. Existing bilateral air 
services agreements, which preclude the introduction of fuel taxes, would need to be 
renegotiated if a kerosene tax were to be implemented on an international level.  
 
So the range of measures tried and examined by governments is large. A few have 
already been implemented and it is likely that in the future travellers will be 
simultaneously subjected to national and supranational (e.g. EU) measures. In earlier 
papers, we studied the UK Air Passenger Duty (Mayor and Tol, 2007) and the EU 
Emissions Trading Systems (FitzGerald and Tol, 2007). We here add the Netherlands 
Flight Tax, and estimate the interactions between the three policies. We also add, for the 
first time, estimates of the impact of these policies on consumer and producer surplus. 
 
Section 2 presents the model design and calibration. In section 3 we discuss the results of 
the analyses. The effects on arrivals, emissions and welfare of the EU, UK and Dutch 
policies are examined in turn. The consequences of combining these policies are also 
underlined. Section 4 then presents a sensitivity analysis, which examines whether the 
welfare impacts observed are robust to changes in the model assumptions and also how 
the results vary if the UK and Dutch taxes change scope. Finally, section 5 provides a 
discussion and conclusions. 
 
 
2. The model 
We use the Hamburg Tourism Model (HTM), version 1.4. Versions 1.0-1.2 were used to 
study the impact of climate change on international tourism (Hamilton et al., 2005a,b; 
                                                 
1 The proposal does not detail what these tax levels would be (Conservatives, 2007). 
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Bigano et al., 2007a; Hamilton and Tol, 2007), while version 1.3 was designed to analyze 
climate policy (FitzGerald and Tol, 2007; Mayor and Tol, 2007; Tol, 2007), but also 
applied to the EU-US Open Skies Agreement (Mayor and Tol, 2008). Version 1.4 has a 
number of new features (such as the climate preferences estimated by Bigano et al., 
2007b), but the relevant one for this paper is that, for the first time, HTM estimates the 
impact of climate policy on welfare. 
 
HTM predicts the numbers of domestic and international tourists from 207 countries, and 
traces the international tourists to their destinations. Total tourism demand is driven by 
per capita income and population size. The demand for international tourism also 
depends on the size of the country and its climate. International destination choice is 
driven by per capita income and climate at the destination, and by travel time and cost. 
 
More specifically, the basic data for the model are for the year 1995, the most recent year 
with reasonably complete data coverage. Data were primarily taken from the WTO 
(2003) and EuroMonitor (2002); see Bigano et al. (2007b). Behavioural relationships, 
estimated for 1995, were used to interpolate missing observations. Data are available on 
total numbers of tourists, international departures and international arrivals. The model 
was used to generate the 207x207 matrix of bilateral tourism flows. The model was 
calibrated such that the row and column totals of this matrix match the observations; the 
matrix itself is not observed. 
 
The model runs in 5 year time periods from 1950 to 2100, but we here only show results 
for 2010. Tourist numbers are calculated as perturbations of 1995. Total demand for 
tourism grows with per capita income, using an elasticity of 0.52. The total number of 
holidays is capped at 6 per year. The share of international trips in total holiday demand 
grows with per capita income, using an elasticity of 0.56 plus 4.6 10-5 times per capita 
income. These elasticities were obtained by minimizing the squared relative distance 
between the model predictions of global tourism demand and the observations of WTO 
(2006) for 1995-2005. Climate also factors into the trade-off between domestic and 
foreign holidays. Tourists from countries with an average annual temperature of 18.6ºC 
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are least inclined to travel abroad. As the temperature gets warmer or colder, the desire to 
spend a holiday in a different climate grows. 
 
The share of international trips in total holiday travel is capped from above by the size of 
the country, using an inverse logistic function with country area to the power of 0.61. 
Tourists from large countries are less likely to travel abroad because the home country 
offers a more diverse range of holiday options. This cap is valid only for countries with 
an annual per capita income above $1,000. Very poor countries offer few holiday 
destination options, and the wealthy few who can afford holidays tend to travel abroad. 
The share of international holidays is capped from below by the size of the country, using 
an elasticity of -0.28, and per capita income, using an elasticity of -0.01. Again, holiday 
makers from very small and very poor countries take their vacations abroad. These 
parameters determine the frontier, and were set by minimizing the distance between the 
frontier and 1995 observations. 
 
International tourists are allocated to their destination countries by four factors.2 Per 
capita income is important, with an elasticity of 0.8, as poverty deters tourists. Climate is 
important too. The ideal annual average temperature is 16.2 ºC; colder and warmer 
destinations attract fewer tourists. Travel time and travel cost are not observed, and 
therefore assumed to be linear in the distance between airports, using data for Heathrow, 
Europe’s busiest airport. The airfare elasticity of destination choice equals –1.50 
+0.14lny, where y is the average per capita income in the country of origin. For UK 
travellers, the elasticity equals -0.45, which compares well to the estimates of Oum et al. 
(1990), Crouch (1995), Witt and Witt (1995) and Wohlgemuth (1997). The time elasticity 
of travel is assumed to be -0.45 too, but is independent of per capita income. Travel costs 
are assumed to fall by 10% per five years, while the value of travel time is assumed to 
grow by 15%. These parameters follow from calibrating the model results to the regional 
observations of WTO (2006). The assumed parameters imply that travel becomes cheaper 
over time and people travel farther as a result. Furthermore, as people grow richer, the 
                                                 
2 There is also a calibration factor for 1995; essentially, all variables that are important to tourists but not 
explicitly listed (e.g., safety) are assumed to be constant at their 1995 values. 
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cost of travel matters less in their decision-making. However, as people take more and 
shorter holidays, travel time becomes more important. 
 
WTO (2003) reports the average expenditure per day per international tourist, as well as 
the average length of stay. Total expenditure per tourist readily follows. As expenditure 
does not have an identifiable relationship with any characteristic of the host country, we 
keep expenditure per tourist constant, and thus make expenditure per host country 
proportional to the number of international arrivals. We assume, somewhat arbitrarily, 
that the profit rate in the tourism industry is 10%, and thus set the change in the producer 
surplus equal to 0.1 times the change in total expenditure. We approximate the change in 
consumer surplus by the change in airfare. For the majority of tourists who do not change 
their behaviour in response to a change in airfare, this is exact. For tourists who do 
change their destination, the difference in welfare between the two destinations must be 
smaller than the difference in the flight tax, so that we overestimate the welfare impact. 
Note that we study the effect of taxation, that is, a loss of consumer surplus. Our estimate 
of the changes in consumer surplus are therefore an upper bound to the actual loss. 
 
Carbon dioxide emissions equal 6.5 kg C per passenger for take-off and landing, and 0.02 
kg per passenger-kilometre (Pearce and Pearce, 2000). Emissions fall by 7.5% per five 
years, following the trend in fuel efficiency in Faber et al. (2007). No holidays at less 
than 500 km distance (one way) are assumed to be by air, and all holidays beyond 5000 
km are assumed to be by air; in between the fraction increases linearly with distance. For 
island nations, the respective distances are 0 and 500 km. Total modelled emissions in 
2000 are 129 million metric tonnes of carbon, which is some 2% of total emissions from 
fossil fuels. This is from tourism only. Total international aviation is responsible for some 
3% of global emissions.3 There are no published numbers on the share of tourism in total 
international travel. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See http://themes.eea.europa.eu/Environmental_issues/climate/indicators. 
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3. Results 
We investigate the impact of three different climate policies for aviation that have been or 
are going to be implemented in the near future. The first is an EU wide scheme using 
emission permits. Then we look at two countries which have individually introduced 
measures to deal with emissions from the aviation sector. The Netherlands is about to 
introduce a flight tax levied on all departing passengers and the United Kingdom has 
recently doubled its flight tax. Although the taxes in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom are boarding taxes, rather than emissions taxes, they have been presented as 
climate policy instruments. The following section will look at the effects of these policies 
in turn and then examine the impacts on emissions and arrivals when all three are applied 
at once. 
 
3.1. The European Union 
In December 2006 the European Commission adopted a proposal for legislation to 
include aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.4 It is planned that by 2012, 
carbon dioxide emissions for all flights arriving in and departing from the European 
Union will be part of the European Trading System for emission permits. The 
Commission states that “including civil aviation in the EU ETS is a cost effective way for 
the sector to control its emissions” (European Commission, 2006). We here consider the 
effect on arrivals, emissions and welfare of a permit price of €23/tCO2, the 2010 futures 
price in early 2008. 
                                                
 
Table 1 shows the effect of including aviation in the ETS on international arrivals in 
2010. There are three effects. Firstly, non-EU visitors are less inclined to visit the EU, 
and travel elsewhere instead. This amounts to approximately 4.3 mln travellers. This is 
equal to a reduction of 1.1% in the EU, and an increase of 0.8% elsewhere. Secondly, EU 
tourists are less inclined to travel far, and therefore tend to holiday in the EU more often. 
This holds for 0.2 mln tourists. This amounts to an increase in the EU of 0.1%, and a 
decrease of 0.3% elsewhere. Overall, therefore, the tourist industry shrinks in the EU and 
grows elsewhere. Thirdly, there is a redistribution of tourists within the EU. Island 
 
4 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/aviation_en.htm 
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nations that depend on aviation see a decrease of 0.1 mln tourists from the EU (-0.7%) so 
that the rest of the EU sees an increase of 0.3 mln tourists from the EU (0.2%). Overall, 
the number of tourists in the EU shrinks by 0.8%, but this represents a fall of 1.2% for the 
island member states, and 0.7% for the mainland. 
 
Table 2 shows the changes in consumer surplus (approximated by the change in actual 
airfare paid), producer surplus (approximated by ten percent of the change in 
expenditures), and total welfare (the sum of producer and consumer surplus) for each of 
the policies. In the EU, consumer surplus falls by €1.1 bln and producer surplus by €0.6 
bln for a total welfare loss of €1.7 bln. Outside the EU, consumer surplus falls by €6.8 
bln as non-EU tourists are restricted in their choice or face higher prices. Producer 
surplus increases by €0.8 bln, for a total welfare loss of €6.0 bln. The world as a whole 
loses €7.7 bln.  
 
Table 3 shows the corresponding emission reduction. Emissions by EU travellers fall by 
68 thousand tonnes of carbon, and emissions by non-EU travellers fall by 343 ktC. 
Considering the previously mentioned welfare losses, this makes for a rather expensive 
policy. Table 4 shows the average cost of emission reduction. If only costs and emissions 
in the EU are considered, the average cost is 77,000 €/tC. If all costs and emissions are 
taken into account, the average cost falls to 23,000 €/tC. This compares to a permit price 
of 84 €/tC. 
 
In summary, the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS using a permit price of €23/tCO2, 
has a number of negative consequences for the tourist industry within the EU as well as 
for consumer welfare both within and outside the EU. Due to the size of the permit price, 
the emission reductions are minimal and carried out at a very high cost. The following 
sections look at the policy instruments used by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
 
3.2. The Netherlands 
As of the 1st of July 2008, the Netherlands will implement a new flight tax. This tax will 
be levied on all passengers on board flights departing from the Netherlands (apart from 
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those in transit). The tax is €11 per passenger for flights less than 2500 km distance, and 
€45 for all other flights (Netherlands Ministry of Finance, 2007). Consequently the flight 
tax on departures from the Netherlands is a boarding tax conditional on the length of the 
trip. Figure 1 shows the effect on the airfare. There are two impacts. Firstly, long distance 
travel becomes more expensive and is thus deterred. Secondly, within each tax band, the 
relative price increase is largest for short haul flights. As relative prices matter more than 
absolute prices, this induces people to fly further. Table 5 shows this pattern. Overall, the 
number of long-distance holidays (over 2500 km) falls by 22,000. However, the number 
of very long-distance holidays (over 12500 km) increases, albeit only by 81. Note that 
Cyprus and Turkey which are just over 2500 km from Amsterdam see the steepest 
decline in Dutch visitors. 
 
The number of short-distance holidays (under 2500 km) increases by 22,000. However, 
this number does not reflect the sharp redistribution that occurs across destinations. Visits 
to island nations that can best be reached by plane fall by 36,000, while the European 
mainland sees an increase in Dutch visitors of 58,000. 
 
The Netherlands also becomes less attractive for foreign tourists. Visitor numbers fall by 
337,000. These tourists travel elsewhere, to avoid Dutch airports and this reduction in 
arrivals is consistently higher than the corresponding decline in Dutch tourism for all 
destinations except the European island nations. 
 
Table 2 shows the associated welfare losses. Global consumer surplus falls by €0.4 bln, 
of which more than a quarter comes from reductions in the Netherlands alone. Producer 
surplus in the Netherlands falls by €0.1 bln. Although producer surplus increases 
elsewhere in the EU (with the exception of the UK and Ireland), global producer surplus 
falls by €0.03 bln. This is because the Netherlands is one of the dearest tourist 
destinations in the world. 
 
Table 3 shows the change in emissions. Emissions by Dutch tourists fall by 5,000 tC. 
Global emissions fall by 14,000 tC considerably less than the result with the EU ETS 
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scheme. Table 4 shows the average costs of emission reduction, which are even higher 
than for the tradable permits of the EU policy. This is no surprise, as the EU policy 
targets emissions directly, whereas the Dutch policy approaches emission reduction in a 
roundabout way. 
 
The scheme by the Netherlands to unilaterally tax passengers departing from its airports 
depending on their flight distance, results in a fall in arrivals into the Netherlands and in 
long-distance holidays becoming relatively cheaper for Dutch tourists. Popular 
destinations for Dutch tourists and foreign residents in the Netherlands, such as Cyprus 
and Greece (both of which are just outside the “short-distance” tax band) are negatively 
impacted. Finally emissions are hardly affected as travel patterns re-adjust to avoid Dutch 
airports. What should also be noted is that the tax is on passengers only. As a 
consequence, flights that leave the Netherlands below full capacity are paying less tax 
and yet contributing as much to emissions. Next, we look at a similar policy in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
3.3. The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom doubled its air passenger duty (APD) in February 2007, to £11 per 
person for flights to the European Union and £44 for all other flights (The Guardian, 
2007).5 Like the Netherlands, the United Kingdom levies a boarding tax, the level of 
which is comparable, €14 and €57 versus €11 and €44 for the Netherlands. However, the 
tax is not determined by travel distance, but rather by EU membership. This means that 
travel to some destinations which are closer to the UK geographically (for example 
Switzerland) are being taxed more than other more distant European Union members 
(e.g. Greece). 
 
Figure 1 shows the effect of the tax. Although the pattern is at first sight similar to that of 
the Netherlands, there are in fact short-haul destinations in the high tax regime and 
medium-haul destinations in the low tax regime. For the Netherlands, the interplay of 
absolute and relative prices makes it impossible to say, based on first principles, whether 
                                                 
5 The UK distinguishes economy classes and other classes; the quoted numbers are the average tax rate. 
 10
emissions would go up or down; however, the numerical model foresees an emission 
reduction. The UK has the same ambiguity. However, destinations between 1600 and 
3200 km are treated very differently, and the boarding tax actually makes a few closer but 
non-EU destinations cheaper to fly to than farther, EU destinations. 
 
Table 6 shows the results for visitor numbers. An additional 85,000 British tourists stay 
within the EU due to the boarding tax. However, short-range holidays fall by 82,000, 
while medium-range holidays increase by 168,000. UK holidays outside the EU fall by 
85,000, but holidays at less than 4000 km distance fall by 177,000 while farther 
destinations see an increase of 91,000. As a result, UK emissions rise by 26,000 tC 
(Table 3). 
 
The perspective of potential visitors to the UK is different, and their number falls by 
964,000. These tourists travel elsewhere, and their numbers more than offset the drop in 
UK visits in the near-EU – but not in the near non-EU. Table 3 shows that emissions 
from the rest of the EU increase too, as people travel farther than the UK. However, 
emissions from the rest of the world decrease as tourists stay closer to home rather than 
travel to the UK. However, this effect is smaller than the increase in UK emissions. 
 
Table 2 shows the welfare implications of this tax regime. The consumer surplus of UK 
tourists falls by €0.7 bln, and other tourists lose another €1.7 bln. UK producer surplus 
falls by €0.7 bln. Although other EU producers are better off, this does not offset the UK 
losses and producer surplus for the EU and the world falls. The welfare changes are 
dominated by the producer surplus effects and the same reductions occur. 
 
Although the UK scheme resembles the Netherlands in the instrument used (passenger 
tax) it is applied in a different fashion and hence produces different results. The tax 
makes travel for UK tourists to far EU destinations relatively cheaper than closer EU 
countries. In parallel, destinations outside the EU that are close to the UK become 
relatively more expensive than countries further away. This results in a shift in 
passengers between destinations and an increase in overall emissions from the UK. 
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Foreign tourists avoid traveling to the UK and as a result emissions from the rest of the 
world fall slightly. The negative effect from the UK on consumer and producer surplus is 
too strong to be compensated by increases in other countries and overall welfare falls.  
 
According to 2008 Budget reports, the APD is set to be substituted by a single tax per 
plane in 2009. The British government’s aim is to send “better environmental signals” 
(HM Revenue and Customs, 2008). Switching the tax from a per passenger basis to a per 
flight basis is a bid to compensate for the emissions resulting from partially empty planes. 
However, airlines hardly need further encouragement to increase the occupancy rates of 
their planes. It is unclear how the plane tax would be transferred to the passengers and 
thus affect behaviour. Presumably, passengers would pay a fixed share of the plane tax 
when booking, and the airline’s shareholders would absorb the uncovered taxes. The 
second aim of the reform is to make the tax better correlated with distance traveled – but 
the proposed plane tax is still unrelated to emissions. Two suggestions have been put 
forward in this regard (HM Revenue and Customs, 2008): basing the tax on great circle 
distance or creating a banded system of concentric zones around London. A distance tax 
would not differentiate between more and less energy-efficient aircraft. The government 
also aims to increase the forecasted total tax revenue from taxes on aviation by 10% in 
2011-2012. It has yet to be decided what form this tax will take and we therefore 
excluded it from this analysis. 
 
3.4. The three policies combined 
Tables 2 and 3 show the impact on welfare and emissions of the three policies combined. 
The model is approximately linear, that is, the effect of the combined policies is about 
equal to the sum of the policies. The error introduced by separately analysing the policies 
is very small for the consumer surplus results. It is generally less than 4% for welfare and 
emission changes.  
 
Global producer surplus show the largest approximation error. The change in global 
producer surplus is small, but it is the sum of large positives and negatives. The sum of 
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the three policies overestimates the impact on global producer surplus by an amount that 
is relatively large but absolutely small. 
 
At first glance, the fact that the three policies supplement each other is a good sign as it 
indicates that if countries take action separately and not as part of a uniform international 
measure, the measures won’t necessarily counteract each other. Unfortunately, in these 
examples the measures taken to curb emissions all have a negative impact on tourism and 
just a very small impact on emissions. Consequently, the combination of the policies 
results in an even higher loss of welfare for each of the countries concerned.  
 
3.5. Discussion 
Tables 2 and 3 show the effect of the EU plan on the UK and the Netherlands. Table 2 
shows the effects on welfare. If a permit price of €23/tCO2, is applied to EU flights, 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and total welfare for the EU fall. The effect on the 
UK and the Netherlands is the same. In the UK, consumer surplus falls by €0.2 bln and 
producer surplus by €0.1 bln for a total welfare loss of €0.3 bln. The corresponding 
figures for the Netherlands are €47 mln, €15 mln and €63 mln. The qualitative pattern is 
the same, but the scale of the welfare effect is obviously different. The importance of the 
UK market in the EU is particularly noticeable. The welfare loss in the UK accounts for 
one-fifth of the total welfare loss in the EU for producer surplus and total welfare. This is 
due to the size of the UK tourism market, and its heavy dependence on aviation. 
 
The welfare impacts for the UK and the Netherlands are significantly smaller in absolute 
terms under the EU scheme than under their own individual schemes. This is because the 
other EU member states are the main source of tourists to the UK and the Netherlands, 
and their main competitors too. 
 
Table 3 shows the corresponding effects on emissions. Under the EU scheme emissions 
by EU travellers fall by 68 thousand tonnes of carbon. There is also a reduction in 
emissions from the UK and the Netherlands. However, the emission reduction in the UK 
accounts for just 3% of the total drop in emission, a proportion that is substantially 
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smaller than the welfare effects (19% to the UK). This is because the UK is an island 
nation, that depends heavily on aviation. British tourists have little choice but to accept 
higher fares, while the British tourist industry will see a relatively large drop in visitor 
numbers. Hence, welfare losses are relatively high, but emission reductions are relatively 
small.6 The very small reduction in emissions from the UK is likely to be due to it being 
an island nation. For the Netherlands, welfare losses and emission reductions are similar 
in relation to the EU total. 
 
4. Sensitivity analysis 
This section presents the sensitivity analyses for the different policies. Previous papers 
have tested the sensitivity of the model to different parameter assumptions, elasticities, 
different price or tax changes as well as the assumptions relating to substitution between 
domestic and international travel. More details about these results can be found in Tol 
(2007), Mayor and Tol (2007) and Mayor and Tol (2008). Overall, the results are as one 
would expect. If the flight tax or carbon tax is higher, it has a bigger effect. If price 
elasticities are larger, the effects are bigger too. A sensitivity analysis of the APD in the 
UK shows unexpected results, but the reason is the design of the tax. Figure 1 shows that 
it is a peculiar environmental tax, so strange results should be expected. The previous 
sensitivity analyses also show that the qualitative pattern of our result is robust to credible 
variations in parameter choice. We will therefore not repeat these exercises here. 
 
Unlike our previous papers, we here estimate welfare impacts. Table 2 shows that the 
impact of climate policy on consumer surplus is always negative. This is no surprise, as 
tourists either pay higher fares or take their holiday in a different place than they would 
have liked. Table 2 also shows that the impact of climate policy on producer surplus is 
negative in the regulated countries, but may be positive in unregulated countries. Again, 
there are no surprises here. Finally, Table 2 shows that total welfare losses are almost 
always negative. There are two exceptions. First, Other EU countries gain from the 
Netherlands flight tax. This is because the producer surplus is larger than the consumer 
surplus, if we assume that the producer surplus equals 10% of tourist expenditure. Other 
                                                 
6 Recall that we attribute emissions to the country of origin of the tourist. 
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EU countries would still gain if the producer surplus would be only 3%, so the qualitative 
conclusion (gain) is robust to variations in the assumed profit rate. Second, other EU 
countries gain from the UK flight tax, but they would lose if the profit rate is set slightly 
below 10%, so the qualitative conclusion (loss) is fragile. For countries outside the EU, 
the producer is always positive but smaller (in absolute terms) than the consumer surplus. 
Total welfare therefore falls. This conclusion is robust, as the profit rate would need to be 
set at 80% or higher to reverse the result. 
 
The Netherlands Government adjusted its planned flight tax even before it became 
effective. Cyprus and Turkey are two popular destinations that are just outside the 
original 2500 km band that differentiates between the low tariff (€12) and the high tariff 
(€45). Both countries are popular holiday destinations, and the Netherlands also has a 
large number of resident ethnic Turks. A flight from Amsterdam to Istanbul was 
originally in the high tariff, but a flight from Eindhoven to Istanbul was in the low tariff – 
even though Eindhoven is not far from Amsterdam, and a return trip Amsterdam-
Eindhoven is less than €33 by train or car. The airport of Cologne/Maastricht is just 
across the Dutch border, and exempt from the tax. So, in response to airlines and tour 
operators loudly announcing that they would shift operations to Eindhoven or Cologne, 
the Netherlands Government has exempted Cyprus and Turkey from the high tariff. This 
is in fact the same as extending the lower tariff band to 3000 km. Table 7 shows the 
implications. The effective tax has dropped, so consumer and producer surplus in the 
Netherlands rise – for a total welfare gain of €4 mln. Emissions increase by 50 tC. 
Consumer and producer surplus in Cyprus and Turkey rise as well, by another €2 mln. 
The rest of the world loses welfare (by €1 mln), as visitor numbers from Cyprus, the 
Netherlands and Turkey fall. However, global welfare increases by €5 mln. Emissions 
from Cyprus and Turkey fall, as they holiday in the Netherlands rather than further afield. 
This more than offsets the increase in Dutch emissions, so that global emissions fall 
slightly by 70 tC. These effects are small – as one would expect from a marginal 
adjustment to a low tariff between smallish countries. 
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The main drawback of the UK boarding tax is that it is based on EU membership rather 
than distance or emissions. This is the main cause of the unpredictable and paradoxical 
results. We therefore assumed that the UK follows the Dutch example and levies the low 
tariff for flights shorter than 2500 km, and the high tariff for longer flights. This is in fact 
a slightly lower tax, so both the consumer surplus of UK tourists and the producer surplus 
of the UK tourism industry increase, for a total welfare gain of €150 mln. See Table 8. At 
the same time, emissions fall by 6,000 tC. Note that emissions are still higher than in the 
case without a boarding tax as it still reduces the relative price of long-haul flights. Table 
8 shows that a boarding tax based on distance rather than EU membership redistributes 
welfare from the rest of the EU to the rest of the world. This is as one would expect from 
the abolishing of a favour-based tariff. The gains in the rest of the world are larger than 
the losses in the rest of the EU, so that global welfare increases by €0.2 bln. Emissions in 
the rest of the world increase slightly, but are still lower than in the case without a 
boarding tax in the UK. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We use a model of international flows of tourists to determine the effects of different 
climate policy instruments on arrivals, welfare, and emissions arising from aviation. We 
find that all three policies examined have different levels of impacts but all are 
detrimental to tourist activity in the countries they are implemented in. The inclusion of 
aviation in the EU ETS using a permit price of €23/tCO2, has a number of unexpected 
consequences. The tourist industry shrinks in the EU and grows elsewhere as tourists 
substitute towards destinations not affected by the price increase. A redistribution also 
occurs within the EU. From a welfare perspective, consumer and producer surpluses for 
the EU fall. Finally, emissions are only reduced by a very small amount and at a very 
high cost.  
 
The scheme by the Netherlands to tax passengers departing from its airports depending 
on their flight distance, results in a fall in arrivals into the Netherlands. Long-distance 
holidays become relatively cheaper resulting in a destination substitution. Popular 
destinations that are usually traveled to by plane, such as Cyprus and Greece (both of 
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which are just outside the “short-distance” tax band) are negatively impacted. Finally 
emissions are hardly affected as travel patterns re-adjust to avoid Dutch airports.  
 
The scheme in the United Kingdom is similar, yet the difference in the way the zones are 
delimited results in some different substitution patterns. In terms of tourist numbers, the 
scheme results in a fall in the number of visitors to the UK, who travel elsewhere to avoid 
the tax. British tourists switch to EU destinations and reduce trips to non-EU destinations. 
However, as some EU countries are further away than some non-EU countries, this 
switch results in an increase in emissions from the UK. Consumer and producer surplus 
both fall.  
 
We also tested the sensitivity of the welfare impacts. We find that the results are robust to 
changes in the assumptions used to calculate consumer and producer surplus. The effects 
of changes in the way the UK and Dutch taxes are applied were also tested. The 
extension of the Dutch tax to include countries within 3000 km distance, which 
encompass popular holiday destinations, causes an increase in welfare for Dutch tourists 
and those from the newly included countries. The impacts on emissions are small due to 
the small number of tourists affected. If the UK tax was based on distance rather than EU 
membership, welfare gains would be redistributed from EU countries to the rest of the 
world and global welfare would also increase.  
 
The introduction of a wide-range of climate policies regarding aviation both at a country 
level and at an EU level could result in the policies complementing each other: the 
consequences of one policy could add to results from another. However, these climate 
policies do not necessarily result in a significant or cost-effective reduction in emissions. 
Moreover, they can end up being detrimental to the country implementing the policy and 
affect incoming tourist numbers. This paper also highlighted the welfare impacts of the 
policies. The Dutch tax is relatively new and its impact has yet to be observed. It will also 
be interesting to see what form the British government’s proposals for a new more 
environmentally targeted tax will take and whether it will avoid the pitfalls of the current 
APD. 
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Table 1. The change in visitor numbers (in 000s and percent) in 2010 for an EU-wide 
carbon price of €23/tCO2. 
to\from EU non-EU Total 
EU 212 0.1% -4269 -1.1% -4057 -0.8 
Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, UK -105 -0.7% -543 -1.4% -648 -1.2 
Other EU 316 0.2% -3726 -1.1% -3409 -0.7 
non-EU -212 -0.3% 4269 0.8% 4057 0.7 
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Table 2. Welfare changes (mln €). 
Policy EU NL UK Combined Error (%)
Consumer surplus 
NL -47 -107 -10 -163 0.3
UK -182 -5 -652 -840 -0.1
Other EU -896 -6 -141 -1044 0.0
EU -1125 -118 -803 -2048 0.0
non-EU -6756 -259 -1526 -8520 0.3
World -7881 -377 -2330 -10567 0.2
Producer surplus 
NL -15 -72 4 -81 3.6
UK -145 -7 -729 -853 3.3
Other EU -433 22 142 -276 -2.7
EU -594 -56 -583 -1209 2.0
non-EU 779 30 182 984 0.7
World 185 -26 -401 -225 7.4
Welfare change 
NL -63 -179 -6 -244 1.4
UK -327 -12 -1381 -1693 1.6
Other EU -1329 16 1 -1320 -0.6
EU -1719 -175 -1386 -3257 0.7
non-EU -5977 -229 -1344 -7536 0.2
World -7696 -403 -2731 -10792 0.3
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Table 3. Emission changes (000 tC). 
Policy EU NL UK Combined Error (%)
NL -3.2 -4.6 2.0 -6.0 -2.5
UK -1.9 2.1 26.1 25.5 2.6
Other EU -63.2 1.1 5.0 -57.4 -0.5
EU -68.3 -1.5 33.1 -37.8 -2.9
non-EU -343.1 -12.5 -83.7 -435.9 0.8
World -411.5 -14.0 -50.6 -473.8 0.5
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Table 4. Average emission reduction cost (€/tC). 
 EU NL UK Combined
Costs in jurisdiction/emissions in jurisdiction 25162 38503 -53005 86100
Costs in jurisdiction/global emissions 4178 12810 27306 6875
Global costs/global emissions 18705 28894 53988 22780
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Table 5. The change in visitor numbers in 2010 for the Netherlands boarding tax. 
to\from Netherlands Other 
Total 
Change 
Netherlands 0 -337126 -337126
< 2500, excl. islands 58157 166286 224443
Iceland, Ireland, Malta, UK -35810 13778 -22032
< 12500 -22427 154425 131998
> 12500 81 2633 2714
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Table 6. The change in visitor numbers in 2010 for the UK boarding tax. 
to\from UK Other 
UK 0 -964196
EU, <500 -81941 153838
EU, >500 167758 418351
non-EU, <4000 -176900 116791
non-EU, >4000 91086 275212
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Table 7. The difference of the impact on consumer surplus (mln €), producer surplus (mln 
€), total welfare (mln €), and emissions (ktC) of the Netherlands boarding tax between 
the original proposal and new proposal with Cyprus and Turkey in the low tariff. 
 Consumer Producer Welfare Emissions
Netherlands 2.739 1.096 3.835 0.054
Cyprus 0.149 0.108 0.257 -0.002
Turkey 2.171 0.007 2.178 -0.119
Rest of the world 0.000 -1.197 -1.197 0.000
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Table 8. The difference of the impact on consumer surplus (mln €), producer surplus (mln 
€), total welfare (mln €), and emissions (ktC) of the UK boarding tax between the 
original proposal and one based on distance. 
 Consumer Producer Welfare Emissions
UK 70.1 77.3 147.4 -5.7
Rest of the EU -0.7 -37.4 -38.2 0.0
Rest of the World 94.6 11.2 105.7 2.6
World 164.0 51.0 215.0 -3.1
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Figure 1. The effect of the boarding tax in the Netherlands (top panel – Cyprus and 
Turkey in pink dots) and the United Kingdom (bottom panel) on the airfare as a function 
of travel distance.
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